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PREFACE 
This study is concerned with the reaction of investors 
to the announcement of a top management change. The primary 
objective is to determine the impact of changes in a firm's 
top management on investors. The secondary objective is to 
determine if investors' reactions differ with respect to the 
origins of new management. Results presented are based on 
an analysis of empirical data gathered from published news 
reports in The Wall Street Journal and transactions occur-
ring on The New York Stock Exchange. 
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Nature of the Problem 
Do top-level management personnel changes affect inves-
tor perceptions of firm profitability? If so, management 
change information is part of the data set used by investors 
and is useful to investors. If not, management change 
information is not part of the investor's set of decision 
criteria. 
The accounting profession has experienced significant 
changes in the past two decades. Two rule-making bodies, 
the Accounting Principles Board and the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board, have been established, and the Committee on 
Accounting Procedure and the Accounting Principles Board 
have been disbanded. Numerous committees and study groups 
have been appointed to study the many facets of financial 
reporting. Currently a comprehensive conceptual framework 
for financial accounting and reporting is being deve1oped by 
the Financial Accounting Standards Board. Change has been 
the password of the accounting profession for the past 
twenty years. New reporting formats, new accounting princi-




A reporting concept supported by many since the early 
1960s is the capitalization of human resources. Basing 
their arguments on the rationale that economic data concern-
ing a firm's employees constitute information useful to and 
needed by investors, proponents of human resource accounting 
claim the additional information will enable investors to 
improve the efficiency and accuracy of their unknown deci-
sian models. If such claims are valid, human resource 
information should be made available to investors. 
The basic premise of human resource accounting is the 
con tent ion that a firm 1 s employees are valuable resources 
akin to those items currently classified as assets. As 
such, changes in the composition of a firm's labor force 
should be measured and reported in the same manner as is the 
practice for the assets currently reported. The validity of 
the basic premise has never been tested. Therefore, all 
arguments using it for support are rhetorical until its 
validity can be determined. 
A method of testing the validity of the basic premise 
is to analyze the effect changes in a known quantity, top 
management, have on another known quantity, market security 
prices. Top management changes and stock prices are pub-
lished in leading trade journals. If employees are viewed 
as valuable resources, an announced change in the most 
valuable of these resources--top management--should cause a 
price reaction similar to that occurring when the value of a 
firm's productive assets are substantially altered. 
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There are philosophical and psychological reasons why 
changes in top-level ma~agement may affect investor percep-
tions of a firm's future profitability and risk. Top 
management may be perceived as a valuable resource of the 
firm akin to an asset by the current and potential owners of 
the firm. They possess many characteristics of items 
currently classified as assets, such as future service 
potential and the capability of providing economic benefit 
to the firm, and often their lives are insured by .the firm. 
Many firms invest in their upper management echelons by 
providing them with extensive management training programs 
and seminars. Thus a top-level manager represents a sustan-
tial investment by the firm. The services the manager 
provides in the future will provide a return of that invest-
ment to the firm. A premature departure of that manager 
causes the investment to be lost. 
The supply of qualified management is limited. As with 
any resource commanding a premium payment, there is a fixed 
number of men capable of completing the required tasks. The 
loss of a scarce resource involves additional costs in 
securing the resources of another and the accompanying 
uncertainty as to its fitness. 
The goals and objectives of a firm are dependent upon 
the dominant members of 
organization objectives 
changes in the goals of 
the management coalition, and 
tend to change in response to 
the dominant participants and to 
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changes in the relationships within the coalition (Caplan, 
1971). 
Investors may view a top management change as a prelude 
to a change in firm philosophy. New top management may be 
perceived as more or less capable than its predecessor. An 
unexpected change in top management may be perceived as the 
culmination of a period of internal conflict between the 
dominant members of the management team, or as the beginning 
of a short-run period of instability as the entity undergoes 
a reassessment of goals and objectives. An expected change 
in top management may be perceived. as the end of one era, 
the beginning of another, or as the expected result of the 
situation the company now finds itself in due to inept 
management or a series of factors which need to be dealt 
with by new people with fresh ideas. 
The factors previously discussed are logical rationale 
as to why top management may be perceived as valuable re-
sources. If they are so perceived, the consequences may 
be far-reaching. If the addition or loss of top managerial 
talent affects a firm's stock price and the owners• evalua-
tion of its potential, hiring and firing decisions become 
of the utmost importance. Timing of the decision is also 
important. The training and retention of the highest qual-
i ty personnel will receive added incentive. The infusion 
into the firm of persons with known abilities will also 
become important. The knowledge that human resource addi-
tions and deletions affect the perceived abilities of a 
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particular firm with respect to the future profitability and 
risk will have a profou~d effect upon the personnel depart-
ments of all major corporations with publicly traded stock. 
All arguments for the capitalization of human resources 
and the inclusion of such data in published financial re-
ports are based on two unproven premises: ( 1} that human 
resource data constitute information to investors, and ( 2} 
that the most efficient, most useful presentation of those 
data, if information, is on the published financial state-
ments. Until both premises can be shown to be true, all 
arguments for human resource accounting are without merit. 
This research is an attempt to provide support for one data 
set, top management, included in the first premise. 
The basic research hypothesis is that corporate inves-
tors use management change announcements in their data sets, 
and that top management changes affect their perceptions of 
a firm's future profitability and risk, hence the market 
value of the affected firm's stock. The procedure used will 
be to analyze the effect top management changes have on the 
market value of the affected firm's stock. 
The Objective of the Study 
The primary objective of the study is to determine em-
pirically determine the impact of changes in a firm's top 
management upon investors. No empirical studies now exist 
having used actual market data to test the impact of man-
agement changes on the market value of a firm's equity 
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securities. This study is expected to provide evidence of 
the information content of top-level management changes to 
one class of accounting information user, e.g., investors. 
It is also intended that this study be the initial empirical 
investigation of the usefulness of human resource data to 
investors. 
The secondary objective of the study is to determine 
empirically determine if the impact on investors is differ-
ent depending upon the origin of the new top-level manage-
ment. Whether investors perceive a greater potential change 
when new management is not previously affiliated with the 
firm or its subsidiaries than when the new management is 
promoted from within the corporate entity is the question 
addressed. 
Significance of the Study 
The proposed research will respond to the question of 
whether investors use one type of human resource informa-
tion, top-level management changes, in their unknown deci-
sion model. Until the usefulness of such data can be 
validated by empirical research, all arguments based upon 
the assumption that investors need human resource informa-
tion are without foundation. If this study discovers that 
investors use management change information in their unknown 
decision model, the usefulness of one particular type of 
human resource information will be documented. 
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The documentation of one kind of useful human resource 
information will lead tv future research documenting other 
types of useful human resource information. After all sets 
of human resource information useful to investors are docu-
mented, research can begin to determine the most efficient 
presentation of the information to investors. This study is 
intended to be the initial step in this process. 
Organization of the Study 
The second chapter includes a review of the impact of 
human resource information on investor decision models. 
Results of past research investigating user group utiliza-
tion of human resource accounting information is analyzed. 
Chapter III is devoted to an explanation of the re-
search methodology employed and presents the specific 
research hypotheses. The research results and analysis 
constitute Chapter IV. 
A summarization of the study and conclusions regarding 
the use of management change data are included in Chapter V. 
Additionally, the implications of the current research 
results are discussed, and suggestions are made for future 
research projects. 
CHAPTER II 
USES OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING INFORMATION 
IN INVESTOR EVALUATION CRITERIA MODELS 
Introduction 
Publicly released financial accounting information em-
anates from two principal sources: firm-genera ted and 
nonfirm-generated. All information is indigenous or exoge-
nous with respect to its origin. Indigenous information 
refers to the published periodic statements and the frequent 
unpublished news releases by a firm. Exogenous information 
is released or published by nonrelated entities. Such 
information takes various forms. Newspaper stories, books, 
lawsuits, and financial evaluations exemplify this type of 
information. 
The publicly released information is used by investors 
and creditors in their unknown decision models to formulate 
probability criteria regarding the future profitability of 
the affected firm. The end result is the establishment of 
market prices for the firm's stocks and bonds. 
This chapter reviews past research which has attempted 
to ascertain the impact of human resource accounting infor-
mation upon external users. 
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User Utilization of Human Resource 
Accounting Information 
The major use of human resource accounting systems 
to date has been to provide information for management 
decision-making. The inclusion of human resource informa-
tion on financial statements released to investors and other 
external users has been proposed, but not extensively done. 
The main reasons appear to have been the failure or inabil-
ity to select an appropriate valuation model, lack of 
objective valuation procedures, lack of acceptance of human 
resources as assets, and the lack of evidence that human 
resource information is used by investors. The last reason 
appears to be the most critical. If human resource informa-
tion is not useful, investors will ignore it. The following 
discussion reviews research regarding this question: Do 
investors, creditors, and o.ther external parties perceive 
human resource information to be useful? 
The lack of evidence regarding the usefulness of human 
resource information to outsiders was underscored in the 
report of the 1974 American Accounting Association's Commit-
tee on Accounting for Human Resources. The conclusion of 
the committee • s report contained the following paragraph: 
Perhaps the most important task facing those who 
wish to advance work in accounting for human 
resources stems from the necessity to demonstrate 
the usefulness of human resource account1ng sys-
tems. Unless empirical data from organizations 
using human resource accounting systems are col-
lected, analyzed, and published, the attractive-
ness of current theoretical arguments for human 
resource accounting may soon lose their glamour. 
(Committee on Accounting for Human Resources, 
1974, p. 124; emphasis added) 
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The report continued: "Research is required to demonstrate 
both the feasibility of human resource accounting and its 
effects on attitudes and behavior" (Committee on Accounting 
for Human Resources, 1974, p. 124; emphasis added). 
The apparent value of human resource data to external 
users of financial information has been alluded to by many 
individuals. Some references and supporting logic follow. 
Gilbert (1970) noted that the value of a firm as a 
going concern is much greater than the value of its tangible 
assets. This is evidenced by the amounts paid by firms to 
acquire other companies in excess of the fair market value 
of the tangible assets. Gilbert believed this difference is 
composed of customer goodwill, patents, and the value of the 
human organization. He supported this contention by stress-
ing that, even for a firm not being acquired by another 
firm, the market value of its stock usually is significantly 
higher than the stockholders' equity because the market 
considers all of the firm's resources and income-producing 
assets, rather than only those shown on the formal financial 
statements. 
Ogolin (1969) asked how a firm reflects in its records 
that its five top management personnel have resigned and 
been hired by a competitor. He implied that they must have 
had some value, since the total market value of the firm 
(Motorola) losing its five top managerial employees declined 
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$88 million, and the total market value of the firm (Fair-
child Camera) hiring these men increased $48 million 
(Ogolin, 1969, p. 36). 
The magnitude of the value of a firm 1 s intangible as-
sets was revealed in a study by Copeland and Wojdak (1969). 
In their study of 169 acquisitions by 26 firms listed on 
the New York Stock Exchange, they found the ratio of total 
unrecorded goodwill to total book value of the acquired 
firms to be $1,604,993,000 to $652,956,000, or 2.45 to 1. 
Pyle ( 1970) contended that an investor 1 s interest in 
human resources is similar to that of management--the 
maximization of the firm 1 s earning power and its efficient 
management. The investor 1 s role, however, is passive. He 
has no control over the magnitude of the investment in human 
resources, nor in its development. Therefore, he is inter-
ested in knowing: 
(1) Where are the funds going? (2) Have important 
changes in the firm 1 s human assets occurred during 
the accounting period? ( 3) Are current earnings 
commensurate with the assets at the disposal of 
management? (4) Is the investment in certain 
human assets excessive? (5) Are there hidden 
values in the firm 1 s human assets? (Pyle, 1970, 
p. 74) 
Elias ( 19 72) attempted to determine if the investment 
decision is altered with the addition of human resource 
information to the financial statements. A questionnaire 
was mailed to a random sample of Chartered Financial Ana-
lysts, Financial Analyists (other than CFAs), and Certified 
Public Accountants. The questionnaire also was administered 
during class time to three college classes: intermediate 
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accounting, advanced accounting, and a senior finance 
course. The experiment attempted to answer the following 
questions: 
1. Will the reporting of human assets in the 
financial statements on the historical cost basis 
cause investment decision to be different? 
2. When human assets are reported in the fi-
nancial statements, will the investment decisions 
be the same for different groups with different 
levels of sophistication in accounting and differ-
ent orientations? 
3. Related to the previous question, what 
are the background or moderating variables that 
may cause decisions to be different? (Elias, 
1972, p. 216) 
Three treatments were used: conventional statements, 
human asset statements, and combined statements {statements 
having both sets of data). A participant was given only one 
treatment and was asked to select which of two companies was 
the better investment. One company { XYZ) was increasing 
its human resources, and thus appeared the better investment 
on human asset statements and vice versa on conventional 
statements. The other company {ABC) was liquidating its 
human resources and appeared the better investment on the 
conventional statements and vice versa on human asset 
statements. 
The study yielded the following results with respect to 
comparing the conventional statement group to the combined 
statement group. In general, company choice was associated 
with the statement treatment. The CPAs had the highest 
association and the intermediate accounting students the 
lowest. Statistical significance resulted for all groups 
except the CFAs and the intermediate accounting students. 
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No statistical significance was found regarding the second 
and third questions: level of sophistication, and back-
ground and moderating variables (Elias, 1972, p. 223). 
Comparing the results of the group receiving the human 
assets statements with the sum of the other two groups 
provided the following results. Company choice again was 
associated with the· statement treatment, but to a higher 
degree. CFAs had the highest association and advanced 
accounting students the lowest. Consistent with the first 
comparison, no statistical significance resulted for differ-
ences in levels of sophistication nor for the background and 
moderating variables (Elias, 1972, p. 224). 
The importance of this study is twofold: (1) It is 
the first attempt . to determine if human asset data affect 
investor decision-making. (2) Statistical significance 
resulted regarding the decisions made. As the first attempt 
at research in a new field, the study did have its limi ta-
tions and is subject to criticism. However, the fact that 
it was done opened the way for others to follow. The 
results, while subject to severe limitations, do show that 
human asset information has the potential to alter decision-
making regarding investment selection. Even though the 
• 
level of significance is low, the result hints at the 
potential impact human resource accounting information may 
have on external users of accounting information. 
Hendricks also studied the potential impact of hu-
man resource accounting information on investors. The 
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experiment attempted to answer two questions: (1) Does 
human resource accounting information affect stock invest-
ment decisions? (2) If so, why might human resource infor-
mation affect the decisions (Hendricks, 1976, p. 293)? 
Hendricks' methodology was similar to that of Elias 
except that only two treatments--conventional and human 
asset statements--were used, and comparative data composed 
of balance sheets for three years and income statements for 
two years were supplied. The subject group was composed of 
91 students enrolled in a graduate finance course; hence, no 
professional subjects were included; 
Subjects in one group received conventional statements, 
made an investment decision, and then received both sets of 
statements and were asked to make the same decision again 
ba·sed on both sets of information without referring to the 
previous decision. A control group received both sets of 
statements initially and were asked to make the investment 
decision only once. 
Three explanatory variables--background, degree of 
openness of the belief· system, and belief statements about 
human resource accounting--were examined also. Three 
hypotheses relating to these explanatory variables were 
' 
tested as well. 
The results of the Hendricks experiment follow. The 
first question was answered affirmatively. Human resource 
accounting information did affect the stock investment 
decision. Statistical significance was found at the • 0005 
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level. The background variables found to be significant 
were those of age and business experience. No significance 
was found regarding the degree of openness of the belief 
system. Significant correlations were found in regard to 
those making belief statements about human resource account-
ing and their use of the human resource information in 
making their decisions. In summary, the Hendricks study 
found that human resource information changes investment 
decisions, and that such changes tend to be influenced by 
age, experience, and a user's belief in the usefulness of 
the information. 
The Hendricks study was subject to the same limitations 
as the Elias study with respect to the laboratory-type set-
ting, lack of a reward-and-punishment system, and the use 
of surrogates for actual investors. The Hendricks study 
did, however, confirm the earlier findings of Elias that the 
only significant background variable is experience. This 
has significant implications regarding the inclusion of 
human resource information on financial statements. Since 
experience appears to be a critical factor in determining 
the use of human resource information, the user must have 
the knowledge and ability to interpret the significance of 
the information. 
Schwan ( 1973) tested 44 bankers with two treatments--
conventional and human resource statements--for a five-year 
period, with no trends in revenues or income apparent on the 
statements. The subjects were asked to ( 1) predict total 
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revenues, (2) predict net income, (3) rate management's 
preparedness, and (4) rate management's capabilities. 
Schwan found significant differences between the groups 
in the prediction of net income and the rating of manage-
ment's preparedness. No significance was found with respect 
to the prediction of total revenues or the rating of manage-
ment's capabilities. 
The Schwan study suffered the same limitations as did 
the Elias and Hendricks studies: only bankers were used as 
subjects, a mailed questionnaire was used, the firms were 
fictitious, no reward-and-punishment system existed, and in 
t~e Schwan study there was no control group. 
The importance of these three experiments is the at-
tempt to show the usefulness of human resource information. 
The results do show that human resource information is used 
and does change the investor's decision, at least in a 
laboratory setting with surrogates for investors. This is 
evidence that the inclusion of human resource information on 
financial statements would provide some investors with addi-
tional information. As both Elias and Hendricks suggested, 
however, the field needs further research. 
Other recent research related to human resource ac-
counting has implied that management changes and management 
control are information to investors. 
Moore ( 19 73) found that income-reducing discretionary 
I 
accounting changes made by companies experiencing management 
changes were significantly greater than for companies with 
no such management changes. Moore hypothesized that new 
management can benefit from these changes in two ways. The 
reported low earnings for the current period can be blamed 
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on the old management, and future income is relieved of 
these charges: hence an improved earnings trend can be 
reported. The intent of the new management appears to be 
twofold: ( 1) to insure their success in the firm, and ( 2) 
to make the firm appear more profitable in the future. The 
effect of these actions on the stock market is not known. 
However, if these management changes are substantive, and 
not merely cosmetic, the market should react when such 
information becomes known. Such actions by the new manage-
ment appear to support the belief that management's actions, 
and hence management's capabilities·, can and do affect the 
profitability of the firm. 
Smith (1975) found that policy decisions made by 
manager-controlled firms smoothed income significantly more 
often than pol icy decisions made by owner-controlled firms. 
The results of the Smith study appear to indicate that the 
relationship a manager has with his firm affects the way he 
perceives the role of external financial reporting. Manag-
ers enjoying job security, as evidenced by ownership of 
stock in sufficient amount to provide such, do not feel as 
compelled to "adjust" the reports to reflect favorably on 
their actions as do those not having job security. This 
implies that the human factor affects the external financial 
statements. Investors, not aware of the control or non-
control capabilities of a firm's management, do not cur-
rently receive such information from the statements. 
Although it is available elsewhere, an investor reacting 
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only to the published information of the firm can make 
erroneous decisions due to the incomplete data set received. 
A study by Eggleton, Penman, and Twombly ( 1976) re-
ported interaction between management changes, industry 
classification, and auditors for firms making accounting 
changes with respect to LIFO valuation of inventories. 
Investigating possible confounding effects biasing the 
results of a previous study, the authors used the same 
sample as Sunder (1973) in order to detect other variables 
affecting the market reaction. The inclusion and signifi-
cance of management changes lends credence to the contention 
that management changes are information. The authors 
stated: 
There might have been a market reaction to firms 
abandoning LIFO, but Sunder could not observe it 
because it was confounded by a reaction to the 
management changes. • • (Eggleton, Penman, and 
Twombly, 1976, p. 87) 
Specifically, with respect to management changes, the 
authors found no abnormal management changes occurring with 
the initial adoption of LIFO, but did find abnormal manage-
ment changes when the decision to abandon LIFO as a basis 
for inventory valuation was made. The authors suggested 
that management changes tend to produce changes in produc-
tion, investment, financing, and accounting decisions for a 
variety of reasons (Eggleton, Penman, and Twombly, 1976, p. 
68). They further suggested that the association of man-
agement changes with accounting changes may be a signal to 
the market regarding the economic implications of the new 
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management's policies. This suggestion implies that manage-
ment and management changes are information used by inves-
tors. If management changes are perceived as having the 
potential to alter the risk and future profitability of a 
firm, then such changes will elicit an investor reaction. 
If not, then accounting changes resulting from management 
changes are "cosmetic" in nature and are ignored by the· 
market. 
Summary 
This chapter reviewed attempts of past research to 
measure user utilization of human resource accounting 
information. Research results imply that the inclusion of 
quantified human resource data affects investor decision 
models. Other variables affecting the decision model may be 
age, experience, and the user's belief in the usefulness of 
human resource accounting data. 
Other research indicates that management policy deci-
sions may profoundly affect the data included in published 
financial statements. New management may depress earnings 
in its initial year in order to make the firm appear more 
profitable in the future. Manager-controlled firms may 
smooth income trends more often than owner-controlled firms. 
Management changes may be followed by accounting changes as 
the new management's policies are implemented. 
Chapter III describes the research methodology and pre-




This research is based upon earlier research regarding 
what has come to be known as the semistrong form of the 
efficient capital markets hypothesis. The definition of the 
semistrong efficient capital market is one in which the 
security prices reflect all publicly available information. 
An implication of this definition is that security 
prices instantaneorisly adjust for any new information becom-
ing publicly available. Therefore, if a data announcement 
affects the share price of the firm making the announcement, 
the announcement contains information. 
Early research on the validity of the semistrong form 
model, by Fama, Fisher, Jensen, and Roll ( 1969}, Ball and 
Brown ( 1968}, and Scholes ( 1969), supported the semistrong 
form hypothesis. Contradictory evidence is scarce (Dyckman, 
Downes, and Magee, 1975). 
Sample Design 
The sample was composed of 55 firms, randomly selected, 
listed on the New York Stock Exchange from January 1, 1968, 
to June 30, 1977, meeting the following criteria: 
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1. The firm must have had a major management change 
(president, chief executive officer, chairman of the board 
of directors) during the time period January 1, 1970, to 
December 31, 1975. 
2. The firm must not have lost its identity through 
merger or acquisition during the 1968 to 1977 time period. 
3. The firm must not have made other· news announce-
ments which could have significantly affected its stock 
prices during the week the management change was announced, 
one week before, and one week after the announcement week. 
4. The firm did not have other major management 
changes witbin 16 weeks before or after the subject change. 
The type of management change is limited to the three 
types listed above for two reasons. Different firms use 
different terminology for their top executives, and these 
three terms appear to be the three most commonly used 
titles. Only top management changes were chosen, since not 
all firms report all changes at lower levels. 
The time period 1970 to 1975 was selected for three 
reasons: ( 1) These years 
which data are available. 
represent a current period for 
( 2) The six-year period allows 
for an adequate sample size. ( 3) Six years is an adequate 
time period in which to draw conclusions not subject to 
severe qualifications due to the possibility that the time 
period included in the study is not representative. 
The period of management change announcements for each 
firm is determined by reference to The Wall Street Journal 
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Index for the six-year period. This source indicates the 
dates on which news ite~a pertaining to firms appear for the 
first time in The Wall Street Journal. Firms experiencing 
management changes but which had other news announcements in 
the critical three-week period of the announced management 
change which could be of such significance as to affect the 
stock price of the firms were disqualified. If a firm had 
more than one management change during the six-year period 
that qualified for use in the sample, each change was used 
unless the changes were less than 32 weeks apart. All firms 
eligible for the sample were initially ascertained. Once 
the total available was known, 55 were randomly selected. 
The total sample consisted of 35 firms with "intrafirm" 
management changes and 20 with "interfirm" management 
changes. 
Research Methodology 
The current research is designed so that a stock market 
reaction to the announcement of a top-level management 
change may be detected through greater than normal fluctu-
ations in the prices of corporate stock. If management 
changes are information used by investors, the expectation 
is that investors in the stock market will react to the 
announced changes in top management. Hence, a significant 
relationship between top-level management change announce-
ments and corporate stock prices should be noted. 
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To determine whether there is an association between 
top management change announcements and stock prices, the 
following variables will be computed for each firm in the 
sample on a weekly basis for 121 weeks. 
= ln 
= ln [ ( SP) t ] 
(SP)t-1 
where: 
Dit = the cash dividend on security i when 
week t is an ex-dividend week, 
Pit = the closing price for share of firm i at 
end of week t, 
P'it-1 = the closing price at the end of week t-1 
adjusted for capital changes (e.g., stock 
spiits and stock dividends), 
(SP)t = the closing value of Standard and Poor's 
500 Price Index at end of week t, 
(SP)t-1 = the closing value of Standard and Poor's 
500 Price Index at end of week t-1, 
Rit = the rate of return on security i assuming 
continuous compounding, 
Rmt = a similar measure for the Standard and 
Poor's 500 Price Index firms (Beaver, 
1968, p. 73) 
The Rit and Rmt values will next be divided i 1nto two 
groups, those determined from the_ weeks designated as the 
management-change announcement period and those determined 
from the weeks designated as the nonchange period. The 
nonchange period values will be used to determine. the 
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relationship of Rit to Rmt (known as Beta) by the following 
market regression model (Beaver, 1968, p. 78): 
= 
where Rit and Rmt are as previously defined, aiBi are the 
intercept and slope of the linear relationship between Rit 
and Rmt 1 and Uit is the unexplained portion of Rit• 
Assuming the relationship between Rit and Rmt constant 
from nonchange period to change period, the fluctuation in 
each stock's Rit due to general market-wide influences will 
be removed by using the ai and Bi values determined for each 
security in the nonchange period. This will be done by re-
arranging the market model as follows: 
/\, 
~it = 
inserting known values for Rit and Rmt 1 estimated values for 
ai and Bi, and solving for ~it• The residual, ~it' presum-
ably includes only the effect on the stock Rit of the infor-
mat ion unique to firm i in time period t (King, 1966, p. 
156). 
After weekly price changes for each firm have been con-
verted to residual price changes, free of estimated 
effects of market-wide influences, it is necessary to estab-
lish a standard of comparison to gauge the extent of the 
existence of a response of stock prices to corporate manage-
ment change announcements. The standard is the average 
price. response for all weekly periods in the 121-week period 
except for the announcement period. 
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The selection of the time period to be used as the an-
nouncement period appeaLs to be dependent upon the type of 
news announcement analyzed. Beaver (1968), in examining the 
information content of annual earnings announcements, used a 
17-week announcement period--8 weeks before, 8 weeks after, 
and the announcement week--to isolate the abnormal price 
changes. May (1971), in examining the information content 
of quarterly earnings announcements, used an 11-week an-
nouncement period--S weeks before, 5 weeks after, and the 
announcement week--to isolate abnormal price changes. 
This study utilizes a nine-week announcement period. 
Past research (Beaver, 1968: May, 1971) indicates that the 
residuals in the weeks of annual and quarterly earnings 
announcements are significantly different from those of 
other weeks. These results and the researcher's desire not 
t,o remove these weeks indiscriminately from the nonchange 
period data resulted in the decision to control against the 
possible inclusion of any of the earnings announcement weeks 
in the management change period by using a shorter announce-
ment period. A 9-week period was selected since it was 
felt that this would be sufficient time to capture any price 
changes without excluding a potential reaction due to pos-
~ 
sible leakage of the impending change before the published 
management change announcement. 
Because this study's concern is not with the direction 
of the price reaction to a management change, but only with 
the magnitude, the 'iii t will be converted to the absolute 
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value of ~it' ~~itl. Beaver {1968) squared the residuals in 
order to abstract from the sign. May {1971) used an abso-
lute value since, as he points out, squaring the residual 
exaggerates the effects on absolute measurement of a few 
large price changes. The absolute value does not give 
disproportional weight to size. For this reason, the 
absolute value method is adopted in this study. An aver-
age I ~it I will be computed for each firm for the nonchange 
period weeks. 
The next step is to divide the jllit I for each weekly 
period in the management change pe·riod by the j ~it I from 
the nonchange period. The ratios over the weeks in the 
nonchange period should have an average value of 1. 0. The 
ratio ~~it! I ~~itl will hereafter be called Uc• After Uc 
is computed for each weekly period in the management change 
period, an average ratio, Uc, across all firms and all weeks 
in the management change period will be computed. It is 
hypothesized that if management change announcements are 
perceived by investors as information different from other 
types of information, the Tic will have a value significantly 
different from one. Because firm-specific information 
preceding and following the announced management change is 
not deleted in computing the !Gitl in the nonchange period, 
the Uc value will be significantly different from one only 
if management change announcements affect investors in a 
different way than other news announcements. 
27 
The initial hypothesis tests for a difference between 
the average ratios of the management change period and one, 
their expected value in the nonchange period. The null 
hypothesis is as follows: 
Ho: The mean of the average ratios of management 
change announcement periods is equal to one, 
i.e., 
Ho: Uc = 1 • 
The alternative hypothesis is: 
Ha: The mean of the average ratios of management 
change announcement periods is not equal to 
one, i.e., 
Ha: Uc 'I 1 . 
Rejection of the null hypothesis provides evidence sup-
porting the a priori expectation that price changes of a 
firm's stock in periods of management changes are signifi-
cantly different from price changes of the firm's stock in 
nonchange periods. Investors thus use management change 
information in their unknown decision models and perceive a 
management change as altering either the riskiness of the 
security or the future profitability of the affected firm. 
Note that failure to reject the null hypothesis does not 
imply that investors do not use management changes in their 
unknown decision models because the current model will not 
isolate as significant information releases of similar 
magnitude and meaningfulness to investors as those included 
in the 1aitl • 
A two-tailed z-test is applied to the sample mean of 
the average ratios to test the statistical significance of 
the difference between Uc and one. 
computed as follows: 
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The Z statistic is 
Z = Uc - 1 I s V n - 1 , 
where Uc is as previously defined, s .is the standard devia-
tion of the unexplained residuals estimated from the sample, 
and n is the number of firms in the sample (Mendenhall and 
Reinmuth, 1971). 
After testing the entire sample of 55 management 
changes for information, the sample will be divided into two 
subgroups--the 35 firms which had "intrafirm" management 
changes (new individuals promoted from within the same 
firm) and twenty firms which had "interfirm" management 
changes (new indiv~duals not previously affiliated with the 
firm or its subsidiaries). 
Doeringer and Piore (1971, p. 13) and Becker (1964, p. 
18) have shown that internal labor markets play an important 
role for all employees of a firm. Penrose (1959) and Marris 
( 1964) have shown that work skills necessary for one team 
are never the same as the work skills required for another. 
Thus an individual is forced to make important changes in 
personal relationships and work habits upon entering a new 
• 
internal labor market. 
The introduction of an individual not previously con-
nected with the firm can be expected to cause greater 
operational and policy changes than the advancement of an 
individual within the same firm. Hence, the expectation is 
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that "interfirm" management changes cause greater price 
changes than "intrafirm" management changes. 
To test the expected difference between the two types 
of management changes, the Uc z-test will be computed for 
each of the two subsamples as was previously performed on 
the entire sample. The expectation is that the "inter-
firm" sample will sh6w greater significance levels than 
the "intrafirm" sample. It is also possible that once the 
two types of management changes are separated, the two 
~-tests may show that investors do not react in a manner 
which causes significant price changes for "intrafirm" 
management changes, but do react significantly to n inter-
firm" management changes. In other words, the following 
two tests may result in z scores which are not significant 
. -
for the "intrafirm 0 management changes but which are 
significant for the "interfirm" management changes. 
The null hypothesis for the 0 intrafirm 0 management-
change firms is as follows: 
Ho: The mean of the average ratios of management 
change announcement periods for firms ex-
periencing "intrafirm" management changes is 
equal to one, i.e., 
Ho: = 1 • 
The alternative hypothesis is: 
Ha: The mean of the average ratios of management 
change announcement periods for firms ex-
periencing "intrafirm" management changes is 
not equal to one, i.e., 
Ha: Uca =I 1 • 
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The null hypothesis for the "interfirm" management-
change firms is as follows: 
Ho: The mean of the average ratios of management 
change announcement periods for firms ex-
periencing "interfirm" management changes is 
equal to one, i.e., 
Ho: = 1 . 
The alternative hypothesis is: 
Ha: The mean of the average ratios of management 
change announcement periods for firms ex-
periencing "interfirm" management changes is 
not equal to one, i.e., 
Ha: Dee :j 1 • 
A two-tailed z-test is applied to each of the sample 
means of the average ratios to test the statistical signifi-
cance of the differences between Dca and one, and Uce and 
one. The two z - statistics are computed as follows: 
Za = De a - 1 I sa yna - 1 I and 
Ze = Dee - 1 I Se yne - 1 I 
where Uca and Dee are as previously defined for the "intra-
firm" and "interfirm" samples, respectively, sa and se are 
the standard deviations of the unexplained residuals es-
timated from the "intrafirrn" and "interfirm" samples, 
respectively, and na and ne are the number of firmg in the 
"intrafirm" and "interfirm" samples, respectively. 
The possible results of the two statistical tests on 
the above hypotheses, with (+} denoting statistical signifi-
cance and (0} denoting no significance, are arrayed in Table 
I. Results 1 or 4 are the a priori expected results. These 
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results are consistent with the expectations of the test on 
the entire sample and with the current tests on the split 
sample. 
TABLE I 
POSSIBLE RESULTS OF SPLIT SAMPLE Z-TESTS 
Result Uca Uce z-test z-test 
1 + + 
2 + 0 
3 0 0 
4 0 + 
The occurrence of result 1 will necessitate further ex-
amination to determine if a difference, in a statistical 
sense, is present. Result 4 will provide evidence of 
greater react ion to "interfirm" management changes than to 
"intrafirm" management changes. This result will imply that 
the impact of new management, as perceived by investors, is 
dependent upon its origins. Result 3 will imply that 
neither type of management change possesses information 
different from other information used by investors. Result 
2 is contradictory to the hypothesis tested. The occurrence 
of this result will contribute evidence inconsistent with 
that of previous research regarding internal labor markets 
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(Becker, 1964~ Doeringer and Piore, 1971~ Marris, 1964~ 
Penrose, 1959). 
Summary 
This chapter presented the research methodology and 
specific research hypotheses. The found at ion for the 
research methodology is the semistrong form of the efficient 
capital markets hypothesis which contends that the securi-
ties market reacts to new information instantaneously in an 
unbiased manner. Evidence in support of the semistrong form 
of the efficient capital markets hypothesis is remarkedly 
consistent. Contradictory evidence is sparse. ·specific-
ally, this research attempts to measure the magnitude of the 
market's response to the announcement of a top-level manage-
ment change. 
The sample consists of 55 randomly selected firms, each 
of which experienced a major management change between 
January 1, 1970, and December 31, 1975. Twenty of these 
changes are "interfirm" and 35 are "intrafirm" changes. 
Statistically the entire sample is tested for informa-
tion content by a z-test of the difference between the 
average ratios of the management change period weeks and 
\ 
one, their expected value in the nonchange period. 
The sample is also divided into two subsamples composed 
of "interfirm" and "intrafirm" management changes. A sec-
ond z-test of the difference between the average ratios of 
the management change period and one is applied to each 
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sample. The results are used to assess the difference in 
investor reaction between the two types of management 
changes. The possible results of these two tests are 
presented in Table I. 
Chapter IV presents the results .and an analysis of the 
statistical tests performed. 
CHAPTER IV 
STATISTICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
Introduction 
Chapter III presented the research methodology and spe-
cific research hypotheses. This chapter reports the results 
of the statistical procedures used to assess the signifi-
cance of the market reaction to management change announce-
ments followed by an analysis of those results. 
The results of the Uc z-test on the entire sample is 
presented initial~y followed by the results of the two 
~-tests performed on the split sample. Following the pres-
entation of each test's results is a discussion an~ analysis 
of the results in the same order. A summary concludes the 
chapter. 
Results 
Uc z-Test of Entire Sample 
The initial z-test was computed to test for a dif-
ference between the average ratios of management-change 
announcement weeks and one, their expected value in 
the nonchange weeks. A Uc for each week in the 9-week 
announcement period was calculated and compared to one. 
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The results of the test for each week in the announcement 
period are illustrated i~ Table II. 
TABLE II 
ENTIRE SAMPLE Z-TEST RESULTS 
Probability 
Week Z-Score of 
Occurrence 
-4 -.20224 .84 
-3 -.06138 .95 
-2 -.18966 .85 
-1 -.14341 .-89 
0 .02828 • 98 
+1 -.05532 .95 
+2 -.11105 .91 
+3 -.04568 .96 
+4 -.12616 • 89 
It is readily apparent that no significant differ-
ence exists between Uc and one in any of the weeks in the 
management change announcement period. The probability 
levels are extremely high. These results imply that the 
information content of management change announcements is 
no different from the average information content of other 
announcements in the nonchange period. 
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Uc z-Tests of Split Sample 
Following the two tests presented previously, the sam-
ple was divided into two subsamples consisting of 35 firms 
which experienced "intrafirm" management changes and 20 
firms which experienced "interfirm" management changes. The 
z-test for the difference between the averag~ ratios and one 
was performed on each subs ample. The results of the tests 
for each week in the announcement period for the two types 
of changes are illustrated in Table III. 
TABLE III 
SPLIT SAMPLE Z-TESTS RESULTS 
"Intrafirm" Change Sample "Interfirm" Change Sample 
Proba- Proba-
bility bility 
Week Z-Score of Oc- Week Z-Score of Oc-
cur- cur-
renee renee 
-4 -.05677 .95 -4 2.04920 .04 
-3 -.05462 .96 -3 -.12811 .89 
-2 .20371 .84 -2 -.38914 .69 
-1 -.15245 .88 -1 -.77269 .44 
0 -.09438 .92 0 1.60789 .10 
+1 -.14371 • 89 +1 1.72744 .08 
+2 -.19579 .-84 +2 -.46827 .63 
+3 -.07905 .93 +3 -.17072 .86 
+4 .05958 .95 +4 -.19584 • 84 
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Splitting the sample reveals a marked difference with 
respect to investor reaction to the origins of new manage-
ment. Market reaction to "intrafirm" management changes 
parallels that found for the sample as a whole. "Intrafirm" 
management changes do not appear to investors to possess 
information of a different type. The market does respond 
differently, however, to "interfirm" management changes. 
This is evidenced by the results obtained for the announce-
ment week and for week +1. 
Analysis 
Uc z-Test of Entire Sample 
The Uc z-test was used to test for an abnormal price 
reaction in the management change announcement week and the 
weeks surrounding the announcement week with in the manage-
ment change announcement period. This test compared the 
average ratios, Uc, for each week in the management change 
announcement period to one, their expected value in the 
nonchange period. If management change announcements were 
considered by investors to be information different from the 
average information content of other news announcements, the 
Uc value would be significantly different from one. As 
shown in Table II, no statistically significant price 
reaction occurred in any of the weeks of the management 
change period. 
The probability levels for the two-tailed z-tests for 
all weeks in the management change period approach one. 
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The extremely high probabilities associated with the change 
period weeks suggest strongly that these weeks, thus the 
management change announcements, do not appear to investors 
to contain more or differ-ent information than the average 
week in the nonchange period. 
In conclusion, the results of the Uc z-test indicate 
no unusual response to management change announcements. 
Investors do not perceive announced management changes, in 
the aggregate, to contain information different from that 
received in other news announcements. That is, the an-
nouncement of a major management-change does not cause 
investors to alter their perceptions of the firm's value to 
a greater extent than the average of other news announce-
ments. 
Uc z-Tests of the Split Sample 
The split-sample Uc z-tests were used to test for a 
difference in investor reaction regarding the origins of new 
management. The expectation was that "interfirm" management 
changes cause different price changes than "intrafirm" 
management changes~ hence, the probability levels should be 
lower and the significance levels higher for the "interfirm" 
management change subsample. 
The test results, as illustrated in Table III, do show 
a type of reaction to the "interfirm" changes different from 
that to the "intrafirm" changes. "Interfirm" management 
changes elicit a greater response from investors in the 
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announcement week and the following week. The response to 
"intrafirm" management changes approximates that of the 
response to the entire sample. The probability levels are 
extremely high, similar to those of the entire sample. 
The investor reaction to "interfirm" management changes 
necessitates additional comment. I am unable to explain the 
result in week -4. The high significance level associated 
with this week is out of character with the remainder of the 
weeks in the management change announcement period. A 
review of all news announcements in week -4 for the 20 
"interfirm" change firms produced rio plausible explanation 
for the occurrence. Only three firms had news releases in 
week -4. All were announcements of quarterly earnings. 
Hence, the -4 week observation remains unexplained. 
In contrast to the other weeks in the announcement 
period, the announcement week and week +1 elicit a different 
type of reaction. Whereas all other weeks except week -4 
have negative standardized ratios, the announcement week and 
week +1 have large positive ratios significant at less than 
.10. The announcement of an "interfirm 0 management change 
apparently affects investors' perceptions of the firm's 
future. 
An interesting phenomenon worthy of further study is 
the behavior of the z scores for weeks -3 to +4. In each 
week preceding the announcement week the average price 
reaction increases negatively, then switches to signifi-
cant positive values for two weeks followed by a return to 
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negative values. Speculating on the reason for this behavior, 
one may propose that rumors about a possible "interfirm" 
management change is imminent. These rumors may have a 
depressing effect on the firm's stock price. Once the 
rumors are substantiated and the individual named, this is 
perceived as good news and the market responds. This 
conclusion is pure speculation on the researcher's part but 
is worthy of future research. 
As previously noted, a two-week adjustment period 
emerges from the analysis. While contrary to past research 
using the semistrong form of the efficient capital markets 
hypothesis and analyzing the effect of accounting data 
announcements, the two-week adjustment period appears 
reasonable because of the following two situations and 
conditions surrounding management change announcements. 
1. Six of the 20 "interfirm" management changes were 
announced on a Friday. The effect of the announcement might 
have been impounded in the following week due to a lag in 
receiving the news, or the inability to react to the news on 
the day it was published. 
2. Additional circumstances surrounding the change may 
have become known the following week, but were not published 
in The Wall Street Journal. 
The difference in investor reaction between the two 
types of management changes may also be influenced by the 
profitability positions of the firms at the time of the man-
agement change. Firms experiencing "interfirm" management 
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changes tended to be poor performers. Characteristics of 
the 20 firms were relatively low market values--less than 
$10 per share--and omission of dividend payments. A change 
in the top management of these firms could be perceived by 
investors as potentially more beneficial than for firms 
currently operating profitably. The infusion of new talent 
is seen as a beneficial change for these firms, whereas the 
promotion of the individual from within the corporate 
structure implies the continuance of the status quo. 
Summary 
This chapter reported and analyzed the results of the 
statistical tests used to evaluate the formal research 
hypotheses. The rE;!sul ts appear to be mixed:. 
For the sample as a whole, no response different from 
the average response to other news items was noted. Prob-
ability levels approach one for the majority of weeks in the 
management change announcement period. 
The analysis of investor reaction to the origins of new 
management provided evidence that the origins did influence 
investor reaction. Investor react·ions to "intrafirm" 
management changes paralleled those of the entire sample. 
" 
Reactions to "interfirm" management changes were signifi-
cantly different in the announcement week and the following 
week. Thus, the addition of previously unrelated individ-
uals to a firm's top management team appears to investors to 
be a different type of useful information~ 
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Chapter V contains a summary of the entire study, the 
implications of the results of this study for the accounting 
profession and industry, and suggestions for future research 
in this particular area. A section containing the conclu-
sions evident from the results of this study is also pre-
sented. 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Summary 
The concept that a firm's employees possess character-
istics akin to items currently reported as assets has not 
been subjected to extensive empirical research in order to 
prove or disprove its validity. Supporters of the concept 
argue that data about a firm's human resources are used by 
investors and should be included on the firm's published 
financial statements. Neither of these two premises has 
empirical support in the current literature. The primary 
goal of this research was to test one subset of the first 
premise: to determine empirically if investors reacted to 
changes in the top managerial talent of a firm. The second-
ary goal was to determine if investors' reactions differ 
with respect to the origins of new management. 
The methodology used assumed the semi strong 
I 
form of 
the efficient capital markets hypothesis.. This methodology 
allows one to test for information content of published 
news releases. To that end, all top management changes 
announced in isolation of other news events in The Wall 
Street Journal between January 1, 1970, and December 31, 
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1975, were ascertained. From 170 eligible firms, 55 were 
randomly selected for inclusion in the final· sample. 
Thirty-five were "intrafirm" and 20 were "interfirm" man-
agement changes. 
After the final sample was selected, the closing weekly 
stock prices of all the firms and the closing value of Stan-
dard and Poor's 500 Price Index for a 121-week period were 
determined. Weekly residual returns were computed for each 
of the 55 firms over the 121-week period. The returns were 
then divided into two groups, the management change an-
nouncement period and the nonchang~ period. The nonchange 
period value was used to determine the relationship (Beta) 
of the firm's rate of return to the market's rate of return. 
The market-wide influences on the security were removed, 
resulting in the emergence of the unexplained residuals. 
These residuals estimated the effect on the security of 
information unique to that security on a weekly basis. 
The residuals across all weeks for each firm in the 
nonchange period were converted to absolute values, and a 
nonchange period average absolute residual was computed. An 
average absolute change period residual was also computed, 
and that was divided by the nonchange period average abso-
• 
lute residual to determine a weekly ratio. The average of 
these weekly ratios across all firms for each week in the 
management change announcement period was calculated. 
The initial hypothesis tested for a difference between 
the mean of the average ratios of the management change 
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period weeks and one, their expected value in the nonchange 
period. If investors had perceived management change 
announcements to be information different from the average 
of other information received in the nonchange period, a 
statistically significant difference would be observed 
between the two values. No such difference emerged. A 
~-test resulted in probabilities between .84 and .98 for the 
nine weeks included in the announcement period. 
Subsequent to the analysis of the entire group of 55 
firms, the sample was split into two subsamples composed of 
the 35 firms which had experienced "intrafirm" management 
changes and 20 firms with "interfirm" management changes. 
Each subsample was tested for a difference between the mean 
of the average ratios of the management change period weeks 
and one. In other words, the initial hypothesis test was 
repeated for each subsample. The results of a z-test showed 
no significant difference for the "intrafirm" management 
changes. "Interfirm" management changes demonstrated 
substantially different price reactions in the announcement 
week and the following week. These results imply that 
investors react differently to management changes depending 
upon the origins of the new management. 
Conclusions 
The results of this research indicate that the informa-
tion content of top management change announcements, in the 
aggregate, was not different from the information contained 
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in other news releases. Investor response to "intrafirm" 
management change announcements approximated that found for 
the entire sample. "Interfirm" management change announce-
ments elicited a response significantly different from that 
of other types of news announcements •. 
The announcement of an "intrafirm" top management 
change elicited little unusual investor response. Investor 
response to this type of management change may be due to the 
characteristics common to the changes included in this 
sample. "Intrafirm" management changes were of three types. 
Sixteen of the 35 changes involved the replacement of one of 
the top three positions with a new individual after the 
resignation, retirement, or death of the previous officer. 
Thirteen changes occurred by the promotion of one individual 
to another top-level position and a replacement being named 
for his old position. Six of the changes involved the 
assumption of an additional position by an individual 
currently holding one of the three top positions; in all six 
cases the individual retained his old position. Thus, in 19 
of the 35 changes analyzed, an individual currently in a top 
management position was either promoted to another top 
management position or assumed the additional responsibili-
ties of another position along with those of the position 
currently held. 
Investors may not respond in a significantly different 
manner to an "intrafirm" management change when a former 
member of the top management team remains on the team. The 
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announcement of a position change or the assumption of 
additional responsibilities by a current member of top 
management is not perceived by investors as affecting the 
firm differently from other news announcements. 
"Interfirm" management change annouricements elicited 
significant response from investors. Again, three types of 
changes were found to be included in the sample. Eight of 
the 20 management changes involved the replacement of one of 
the three top management positions. Another eight changes 
resulted in the new individual filling two new positions; in 
all eight cases, the new positions were president and chief 
executive officer. The remaining four changes resulted in a 
new individual being brought in as president and chief 
executive officer and the former holder of these positions 
being appointed chairman of the board of directors. 
The reactions of investors imply that they perceive 
these changes as affecting the firm differently from other 
information. Hence, the investors' unknown decision models 
are altered regarding the firm's future. 
In Chapter IV these firms were characterized as poor 
performers. It appears that the firm's attempt to improve 
its operating efficiency does not go unnoticed by the 
market. The management changes signal a change 1 or an 
attempt to change, the firm philosophy. Since potential 
rewards to investors from an improvement in the profitabil-
ity of these firms are greater than for firms already 
operating successfully 1 this type of management change is 
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perceived differently from other information used by the 
market. 
In conclusion, the replacement of existing management 
with new individuals not previously connected with the firm 
is perceived by investors as different information. The 
management change announcement causes an altering of inves-
tor expectations regarding the future profitability and/or 
risk of a firm experiencing an "interfirm" management 
change. 
Implications 
The results of this research are significant for a firm 
contemplating a major management change. Future research 
regarding the usefulness of human resource information has 
also benefited by the current study. 
Previous research utilizing the semistrong form of the 
efficient capital markets hypothesis evaluated the informa-
tion content of accounting reports and changes in accounting 
principles. This research addressed the question of whether 
investors respond differently to management change informa-
tion than to other types of information. 
The study's objective was to determine if investors re-
' 
spend to top-level management change announcements in a 
manner different than they do to other news announcements. 
If so, the study's significance was the documentation of one 
type of useful human resource information. 
------------
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For a firm contemplating a major management change, the 
results of this study may be significant. If a goal of the 
firm is to increase the market value of its outstanding 
common stock, the origin of the new management may be 
important. The market reacts differently to "interfirm" 
management change announcements than to "intrafirm" manage-
ment change announcements. The direction of the reaction is 
outside the scope of this research. However, depending upon 
the profitability position of a firm, an "interfirm" manage-
ment change could conceivably increase the market's percep-
tion of the firm's value or alter its perceived riskiness. 
If the new management is perceived as more capable than 
existing management,. the change should cause a positive 
reaction. Thus, in the short run, a firm could increase the 
market value of its common stock more by hiring its new 
management from an unrelated entity. 
This study has expanded the horizons for future re-
search regarding the effect of human resource information on 
investors. One type of human resource information has been 
shown to affect investors' decision models differently than 
other information. Research can now be initiated to iden-
tify other types of human resource information affecting 
investors in a similar manner. Research can also be started 
to identify all human resource data constituting information 
to investors. The documentation of all sets of human 
resource information is necessary before research can begin 
to determine the most efficient reporting format. 
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Recommendations 
As with all pioneering research utilizing a borrowed 
methodology, the methodology is suspect. It is possible 
that the methodology used is not proper for this particular 
type of news announcement. As such, it could be beneficial 
to repeat the study using another type of methodology. 
The determination of the directional effect of manage-
ment changes could have significant implications on future 
changes in top management and the deployment of top-level 
m?nagement personnel. A sign test on the ~it in the report 
period as opposed to those in the nonreport period would 
allow for the evaluation of the directional affect. 
Another change in the current methodology is to reduce 
thu management change announcement period to one week--the 
week in which the management change is announced. The 
reduction of the change period to one week further isolates 
the effect of the change, allowing for the evaluation of 
only that one piece of information. 
Another change in the current methodology is to elimi-
nate from the nonchange period the annual and quarterly 
earnings announcement weeks. The residuals in these weeks 
are known to be significantly greater than other' weeks. 
Their elimination would allow for the determination of the 
relative magnitude of the information content of a major 
management change announcement. 
The sample in this study is heterogeneous with respect 
to management origins and characteristics of management 
---------------------
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changes. A repeat of the study using an equal number of 
"intrafirm" and "interfirm" management changes would correct 
for the disproportional weight of the "intrafirm" management 
changes in this study. In addition, a sample composed of 
firms whose management changes resulted in the same position 
being filled for both "intrafirm" and "interfirm" management 
changes may be desirable. The replacement of a president or 
chief executive officer may be viewed as more significant 
than the replacement of the chairman of the board of direc-
tors, and the replacement of a president when the vacating 
president is removed from all managerial authority may be 
considered more significant than when the former president 
assumes another top-level managerial position. 
The potential for empirical research in human resource 
accounting is unlimited. All past research studies investi-
gating the impact of human resource accounting information 
on investor decisions have used laboratory settings. This 
research is the first empirical attempt to document the 
actual use of human resource information. Following are six 
suggested research projects to empirically test the useful-
ness of human resource information. 
1. Determine the effect of large-scale layoffs on the 
market price of a firm's stock. These announcements imply 
the contraction of production, hence lower profits in the 
immediate future and the potential loss of trained employees 
necessitating additional training costs and lower production 
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efficiency in the future when full-scale production is 
resumed. 
2. Analyze the effect of multiperson managerial 
changes on the market value of a firm. Proponents of human 
resource accounting use two examples of this type of change 
to support their arguments. An empirical analysis could 
confirm or deny the validity of these arguments. 
3. Analyze the effect on the market value of a firm 
announcing a relocation of operations. When a firm re-
locates, not all of its current employees do likewise. 
Thus, a firm is forced to hire and train new individuals. 
If the current employees of the firm are viewed as valuable, 
the relocation should affect the market's perception of the 
firm's current value. 
4. Identify labor-intensive and capital-intensive 
firms. Select an event typical of each type of firm involv-
ing a change in personnel. Analyze the event's effect on 
the market value of each firm. If human resource data are 
information to the market, labor-intensive firms should be· 
more sensitive to these changes. 
5. Repeat the current research study, but analyze the 
difference between each firm's average unexplained residual 
• 
in the management change announcement period and zero, the 
expected value in the nonchange period. The isolation of 
individual firms whose top-management changes cause investor 
reaction will encourage research aimed at determining the 
attributes responsible for the investor reaction. 
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6. Repeat the current research study for abnormal 
changes in the volume ~f stock traded rather than price 
changes. 
Research regarding the usefulness of human resource ac-
counting data is just beginning. What may be taken for 
granted as useful or useless may be disproven by research. 
Which are useful data and how they are used is yet to be 
discovered. Future research should address these two 
questions. 
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"Intrafirm" Management Changes 
Aetna Life & Casualty ••••••••••• February 2, 1970 
American Cyanamid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . October 19, 1972 
American Hospital Supply Co ••••• March 23, 1970 
Arnetek, Inc._ .•••.•.••...••.•.•.. January 27, 1970 
Armstrong Rubber •••••••••••••••• June 18, 1971 
Avon Products Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . January 10, 1972 
Avon Products Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . December 13, 1973 
Castle and Cooke •••••••••••••••• June 11, 1973 
CIT Financial Corp •••••••••••••• June 29, 1973 
Continental Copper and Steel •••• December 31, 1971 
Cutler Hammer ••••••••••••••••••• November 27, 1974 
Dillingham Corp ••••••••••••••••• September 24, 1970 
• 
Ennis Business Forms •••••••••••• March 1, 1973 
Ferro Corp •••••••••••••••••••••• August 21, 1972 
Foxboro Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . December 23, 1970 
Foxboro Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ·April 30, 1973 



























Hanes Corp. ~ •••.•••••••••••••••• 
s. s. Kresge ••••••••••••••••••.• 
Lear Sigler ••••••••••••••••••••• 
Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass ••••••••• 
Liberty Loan •••••••••••••••••••• 
May tag Co. • ••••••••••••••••••••• 
Miles Laboratories •••••••••••••• 
Oklahoma Natural Gas •••••••••••• 
Peoples Drug Stores ••••••••••••• 
Rochester Gas & Electric •••••••• 
Safeway Stores •••••••••••••••••• 
San Diego Gas & Electric •••••••• 
Stone Container Corp. • •••••••••• 
Sunbeam Corp •••••••••••••••••••• 
Thomas & Betts Corp ••••••••••••• 
Toledo Edison Co •••••••••••••••• 
United Nuclear •••••••••••••••••• 




June 1, 1972 
June 18, 1970 
58. 
September 30, 1974 
December 19, 1975 
March 26, 1970 
December 21, 1973 
June 26, 1973 
December 9, 1971 
April 1, 1970 
August 23, 1974 
December 20, 1973 
October 22, 1970 
May 5, 1972 
June 21, 1971 
January 3, 1974 
August 23, 1972 
January 14, 1975 
April 7, 1970 
"Interfirm" Management Changes 
Addressograph-Multigraph Corp ••• 
Automation Industries ••••••••••• 
Carlisle Corp ••••••••••••••••••• 
Continental Copper and Steel •••• 
January 27, 1971 
March 2, 1971 
September 15, 1970 




















Dictaphone Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
General Portland Cement . . . . . . . . . 
Great Western Financial . . . . . . . . . 
Gulton Industries ••••••••••••••• 
IPCO Hospital Supply •••••••••••• 
Leeds and Northrup •••••••••••••• 
Macke Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Madison Square Garden ••••••••••• 
Michigan Gas Utilities •••••••••• 
National Gypsum ••••••••••••••••• 
Republic Corp ••••••••••••••••••• 
Royal Crown Cola •••••••••••••••• 
Simmonds Precision •••••••••••••• 
Standard Pressed Steel •••••••••• 
Victor Comptometer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 




August 6, 1971 
59 
November 25, 1975 
June 25, 1975 
December 1, 1971 
July 13, 1973 
January 5, 1973 
November 9, 1971 
May 8, 1974 
September 4, 1970 
February 9, 1971 
June 6, 1973 
December 10, 1974 
November 11, 1974 
May 17, 1971 
June 12, 1970 
April 1, 1974 
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